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THE HOCH-SMITH RESOLUTION AND THE




The intimate and reciprocal relationship between railroad rate
structures and the economic development of the competing localities
which are dependent upon the carriers has been the source of many
spectacular and bitterly fought railroad rate cases. Probably more
than any other single human agency, the railroads are responsible for
our present economic map. At the same time, few facts have been
more persistently reiterated in our industrial history than the vitality
of sectional jealousies. The subjection of the commercial destinies
of sectional interests to railroad domination has not been welcomed
by the victims.' When the railroads were not merely the principal,
but substantially the only means of commercial transportation-and
in those remaining fields where they still are-competing localities
interested in each stage of the economic process have fought time and
again before the Interstate Commerce Commission for positions of
relative advantage.
With regard to each major commodity the story is repeated. Pro-
ducers desiring to reach the same markets, markets desiring to reach
the same producing fields, intermediate gateways desiring to divert
traffic through their routes, all have come to the Commission to im-
prove their positions at the expense of their competitors. Such has
been the stuff of the Intermountain Rate Cases,2 the Lake Cargo3 and
other coal cases, the Sugar Cases of J922 4, the Salt Cases,5 grain cases,
*Instructor in Government, Yale University.
'Take, as a random sample, this comment from a trade-journal editorial dis-
cussing "The Pittsburgh Rate Case" in 1912: "This disposition on the part of the
railroads to be the ruling factor in the destiny of any coal field is a distinct im-
position on the industry, and one long resented by it." (1912) 1 CoAL Ao 95o.
22 I. C. C. 329 and 400 (I911); x91 Fed. 856 (Comm. Ct. 1911); 234
U. S. 476, 34 Sup. Ct. 986 (*914).
322 I. C. C. 604 and 640 (1912); 46 1. C. C. 159 (1917); 1x I. C. C. 513 (1925);
126 I. C. C. 309 (1927); 139 I. C. C. 367 (1928). Court decisions in this case are
cited infra notes zo and ix. Western Pennsylvania Coal Traffic Bureau v. B. & 0.
R. R. et al., Docket No. 23241, recently argued before the Commission, is the
latest in the series. 481 I. C. C. 448 (1923).
.92 I. C. C. 388 (1924); 6 F. (2d) 3r5 (N. D. Ohio, 1925); 122 I. C. C. 21
(1927); 22 F. (2d) i99 (W. D. N. Y. 1927).
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cotton cases, and port differential cases. To curb the railroads in
the exercise of their rate-making powers in such fashion as to pro-
mote or discourage the development of localities was one of the prin-
cipal objects of regulatory legislation. Section 3 of the Interstate
Commerce Act, prohibiting undue preference and prejudice, and
Section 4, the long-and-short-haul clause, clearly embody this aim.a
Yet the transfer of one carrier power after another to the field of
Commission control served only to increase th6 emphasis with which
the Commission repeated that within the maximum limits which it
might impose the managerial discretion of the carrier was untram-
meled.6  With the economic effects upon those who felt their influence
of rates lawfully set, the Commission declined to be concerned. The
railroads were still expected to compete with each other, and in
the hope of increasing traffic might offer shippers voluntarily con-
ditions that the Commission could not or would not impose. Thus
the carriers' power to influence the course of economic development
has remained large.
Perhaps no group of shippers have been more consistently resentful
of this domination by their carriers, or more indefatigably vocal in
expressing their resentment, than the agricultural communities of
the middle west. No group has more successfully organized its politi-
cal force for the purpose of influencing legislation than the national
farm organizations that maintain lobbies or legislative bureaus in
Washington.7 Since the time of the Granger movement the farmers
have complained of the treatment accorded them by their carriers as
compared with that enjoyed by the industrial communities of the
East. The obvious railroad rejoinders, based on differences in cost
and in traffic density, did little to assuage their wrath.
Naturally, those who complain of discrimination are those who
suffer from it, and their evidence consists chiefly of a recital of their
woes. Not all economic woe is the result of rate discrimination, but
there are not many instances of wide depression where the victims
6a4I Stat. 479, 480 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 3, 4 (i929).
6For example, Commissioner Lane in one of the early Lake Cargo cases: "This
Commission does not sit as a supreme traffic manager for the railroads of the
country... It is not our function to equalize commercial conditions or to es-
tablish zones of trade or bring markets into competition one with another...
In so far as the West Virginia miner needs to rely upon the sympathy of his
serving carrier or upon its policy with respect to the wisdom of making a low
rate in order to secure his traffic or develop his mines to serve a distant territory,
his appeal must be to such carrier and not to-this Commission." Advance in
Coal Rates by the C. & 0., 22 I. C. C. 6o4, 612 (1912). See infra note i7.
2Bspecially the American Farm Bureau Federation and the National Grange.
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are not persuaded that lower rates would help them. More than a
showing of depression, however, is necessary to establish unlawful
discrimination under Section 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act.
The post-war depression in agriculture had not proceeded very far,
therefore, when the agitation in Congress to secure more favorable
treatment for farm products in the matter of rates began to insist
upon new legislation. The movement resulted, early in 1925, in the
passage of the Hoch-Smith Resolution.8
The Resolution, as passed, affected other fields besides agriculture,
though no other subject was specifically mentioned. On its face it
seemed to reverse long-standing policy by ordering the Interstate
Commerce Commission, in fixing rates, to give attention to the con-
ditions prevailing in each industry and the relative price levels of
commodities. Thus it seemed to make the need of rate relief the
criterion for granting it, at the expense .of the railroads or of more
prosperous shippers. If it was somewhat of a departure as an exer-
cise of the commerce power, it was certainly not novel as a reflection
of Congressional impulses. The legal result seemed to be, if need
were the basis of relief, that in those situations where industries or
communities were already complaining of rate discriminations under
Section 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act, there was added another
cause for action, depressed condition. Most cases involving the far-
mer had also elements of the latter. Final judicial interpretation of
the Resolution has therefore been anticipated with interest.
The Resolution was quickly seized upon by coal interests then en-
843 STAT. 8O (1925), 49 U. S. C. A. § 55 (1929) approved Jan. 30, 1925. The
Resolution declared it to be "the true policy in rate-making,.. that the con-
ditions which at any given time prevail in our several industries should be'
considered, in so far as it is legally possible to do so, to the end that commodities
may freely move." It directed the Commission to enter upon a thorough investi-
gation and revision of the entire freight rate structure of the country, to correct
unlawful rates, and in doing so, to "give due regard, among other factors, to the
general and comparative levels in market value of the various classes and kinds of
commodities as indicated over a reasonable period of years, to a natural and
proper development of the country as a whole, and to the maintenance of an
adequate system of transportation." Finally, it directed the Commission, in
view of the existing depression in agriculture, "to effct... such lawful changes
in the rate structure ... as will promote the freedom of movement by common
carriers of the products of agriculture... at the lowest possible lawful rates com-
patible with the maintenance of adequate transportation service."
Federal court decisions, including that of the Supreme Court in the Ann Arbor
case, and Commission reports, interpreting or citing the Resolution, are collected
in Interstate Commerce Acts Annotated, pp. 2833-2841, a compilation by Com-
missioner Aitchison recently published in five volumes as SEN. Doc. 166, 7oth
Cong., Ist Sess. (1930).
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gaged in one phase of the Lake Cargo Coal controversy. The de-
pressed and disorganized condition of this industry over a period of
years was as notorious and as serious as anything experienced in
agriculture. The issues in the Lake Cargo cases concerned the relation-
ship of the rates on coal shipments from the Pennsylvania and Ohio
fields on the one hand, and from the West Virginia and Kentucky
fields on the other, to Lake Erie ports for transshipment in cargo
vessels to the Northwest. The lake markets are a competitive focus
of the bituminous industry, and under the existing adjustment the
more distant southern producers were able to make large inroads
upon what thenorthern coal operators had come to regard as "their"
markets. Both sides urged the Resolution in support of their claims
and vied in a showing of depression, in addition to their claims under
Sections i and 3. A Commission decision in 1925 adverse to the
Pennsylvania contentions was reconsidered, stirring a political tur-
moil in the Senate. It was followed by two decisions adverse to
West Virginia. 9 One ordered a reduction in the Pittsburgh rate; the
other forbade a corresponding reduction from West Virginia. The
latter of these was enjoined by a three-judge federal court, which de,
nounced the Commission's arrogation of the power to determine the
economic destinies of particular sections of the country.10 The appeal
from this decision seemed likely to draw from the Supreme Court an
authoritative exposition of the Resolution. During the pendency of
the appeal, however, while feeling between the political representa-
tives of the two sections was at its highest, and both sides belabored
the Commission, the railroads involved came to a compromise agree-
ment on the rates. The Court, doubtless much relieved, thereupon
dismissed the case as moot,"1 although the original complainants, the
shippers, were not parties to the agreement. Another case was neces-
sary to force the issue; and it came in the form of a contest between
the California fruit interests and the railroads serving them.
II.
The long-awaited decision in Ann Arbor R. R. et al. v. United States
et al." is the first, and perhaps will be the last expression by the
Supreme Court upon the Hoch-Smith Resolution, now past six years
9Supra note 3. The principal incidents of the political turmoil are related by
G. H. Robinson, The Hoch-Smith Resolution and the Future of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, (1929) 42 HARV. L. REv. 61o, 631.
10Anchor Coal Co. v. United States, 25 F. (2d) 462 (S. D. W. Va. 1928).
nU. S. v. Anchor Coal Co., 279 U. S. 812,49 Sup. Ct. 262 (1929). Memo. opin.
2281 U. S. 658, 50 Sup. Ct. 444 (1930). The opinion includes a reprint of the
Resolution in full.
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old.. The original complainants in the case were the California
Growers' and Shippers' Protective League, an association of de-
ciduous fruit growers, whose products, chiefly grapes, constituted
the largest single item in west-east transcontinental freight. Cali-
fornia fruit is grown in quantities largely in excess of local require-
ments, and the bulk of it is shipped to eastern markets, there to com-
pete, especially on the Atlantic seaboard, with fruit from Florida and
elsewhere. It is able to enter eastern markets only by reason, first,
of a highly developed organization of growers that regulates com-
prehensively the marketing of its members' produce, both the quality
and the quantity of fruit sold, and second, of a competitive freight
rate that ignores the greater distance.
The rate zones on freight from California east, designated by the
letters A to J and covering the area from the Atlantic west to Denver,
are all blanketed together for deciduous fruit, and a single freight
rate, (exclusive of the graduated refrigeration charge), applies to the
haul from California, whether the shipment be consigned to Kansas
or to New York. This is the largest rate blanket in the United States.
It was established by the western trunk line carriers, on the one hand,
to meet the requirements of the long-and-short-haul clause, and on
the other to increase their volume of traffic, a need they have long
felt, by enabling the large producing field they served to reach the
widest possible markets. This rate structure was the result of keen
competition, both among the carriers for traffic, and among the Cali-
fornia, Florida and other shippers for markets. It was built up large-
ly on opportunist principles, over a period of years that saw America
transfer its gastronomic affections from bread and meat to fruit and
vegetables, and it has survived with little change.
In 1923 the California growers attacked the transcontinental
blanket rate of $1.73 per hundred pounds, in carloads, applicable on
deciduous fruits to all the rate territories east of the Denver group,
asserting that the figure was unreasonable and unduly preferential
and prejudicial. They relied upon Sections i and 3 of the Interstate
Commerce Act. They declared that while freight charges meant
little when fruit prices were high, they meant much when prices were
low; and they showed that since 1922 prices had been low without
any corresponding decrease in production costs, and that freight rates
on deciduous fruits since the war had not decreased proportionately
with those on other articles. The Hoch-Smith Resolution was passed
while the case was still being considered, but after the argument had
been heard, and so did not greatly effect it at that stage. The decision
on this original petition was rendered on June 25, 1925, by Division i,
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Commissioners McChord, Lewis, and McManamy. It found the
rates not unreasonable or unduly prejudicial, and dismissed the com-
plaint, but "without prejudice to any conclusion which may be
reached upon the later and more comprehensive record concerning
the relation of railroad rates to agriculture which is expected to be
developed in Docket No. r7ooo.' u3
This Docket No. 17000 is the one in which the Oommission was
assembling its general investigation of the entire rate structure, as
commanded by the first paragraph of the Hoch-Smith Resolution.
At the time of this 1925 decision the Resolution had been on the
statute books a scant five months. Acting on the implied invitation,
the fruit growers, a year and a half later, renewed their complaint,
placing more reliance on the Resolution than on Sections i and 3 of
the Act. This time they secured a reversal in the Commission. Its
order granted a reduction, 14 and it is this order which has itself just
been reversed by the Supreme Court in the Ann Arbor decision.
The Commission had meanwhile got under way in Docket 17000,
and had at the same time invited the views of shippers, carriers and
the public generally as to the meaning of the Resolution and the pro-
cedure to be followed under it.15 Opinion had been sharply divided in
Congress as to whether the Resolution was a gesture, "a mere sop...
that Members... will fondly carry home to show to their farmer
friends," or whether it added anything to the Commission's power,
and if so, whether wisely. Individual Commissioners also were not
at one in interpreting its language." Pressure from shippers, how-
ever, was insistent that conditions prevailing in various industries
"California Growers' and Shippers' Protective League v. Southern Pacific
R. R., 100 I. C. C. 79, io8 (1925).
4California Growers' and Shippers' Protective League v. So. Pac. Co. et al.,
129 I. C. C. 25 (1927).
139th ANN. REP., I. C. C., 37-40 (1925). Current progress in Docket No.
17ooo is briefly reviewed in each succeeding Annual Report.
15The debates in Congress prior to its passage were brief and inconclusive. See,
for examples, 65 CONG. REc. 8336 ff. and 65 CONG. REc. 11022 ff. (1924). They
are summarized and commented on by G. H. Robinson, op. cit. supra note 9, at
618-619, n. 30. Expressions of the views of individual members of the Com-
mission may be found in some of the reports in Docket 17ooo; in the Hearings
before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on the Confirmation of John J.
Rsch, 7oth Cong., ist Sess., 143-144, 223 (1928); in the Lake Cargo Case, 126 I.
C. C. 309, 367, 374; and in (1929) 43 TRAFFIc WORLD 170; not to mention the
opinions in the case here reviewed.
The Resolution was the outgrowth of several measures previously introduced,
some of which undoubtedly were intended to alter basically the Interstate Com-
merce Act. But the Resolution as finally allowed by its opponents to pass, was
amended in the direction of vagueness.
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should be considered, and the Commissioners evidently felt that
while members of Congress might vote as a gesture, they themselves
were scarcely at liberty to treat so lightly what had in law the force
of a statute."' A majority felt, therefore, that the Resolution com-
manded them substantively to abandon the position they had long
held, which had been given its classic form by Commissioner Lane:
"It seems unnecessary here to state that the power has not
been lodged with this tribunal to equalize economic advantages,
to place one market in competition with another, or to treat all
railroads as part of one great whole, and apportion to each a cer-
tain territory, or to require all to meet upon a common basis
at all points."' 7
In so doing, the Commission gave up a line fortified by expressions of
the Supreme Court of similar import.18 They began, in a series of
cases commencing even before Ex parte 87, Revenues in the Western
District,l" the first case under Docket 17000, to take account of the
l6aJoint resolutions "are really bills and in procedure are treated like bills.
Opinion as to what a joint resolution might include has changed from time to
time." R. LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE (1922) 556; I WATSON, THE CONSTI-
TUTION (1910) 379. The distinction between the two is purely historical, and is
recognizable now only in the form of the enacting clause. Watson's statement,
ibid., that "a statute can neither be repealed nor amended by a joint resolution",
rests on an Ohio decision, State v. Kinney, 56 Ohio St. 721 (1897), and is con-
trary to the present settled procedure of Congress. There has been no direct ad-
judication of the point in a Federal court, but in the Ann Arbor case under dis-
cussion, the Supreme Court, in denying that the Hoch-Smith resolution had
changed the interstate commerce act, tacitly assumed that it could have done so,
else the decision should have gone on that ground. The distinction between
joint and concurrent resolutions, the latter of which do not require the President's
signature and have no legislative effect, was the subject of a report by the Senate
Judiciary Committee, Rep. No. 1355, 54th Cong., 2d Sess.
17Ashland Fire Brick Co. v. So. Ry. Co., 22 I. C. C. 115, 121 (igi1).
13I. C. C. v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U. S. 42, 46, 32 Sup. Ct. 22, 24, (1911); cf.:
"Many causes may cooperate to give one state, by reason of local laws or con-
ditions, an economic advantage over others. The Commerce Clause was not in-
tended to give to Congress a general authority to equalize such conditions."
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 273, 38 Sup. Ct. 529, 532 (I9x8); United
States v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 263 U. S. 515, 524, 44 Sup. Ct. I89, I93 (1924).
But the unification under Federal control opened new vistas, and the Trans-
portation Act of 1920 contemplates some equalization among carriers. New
England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184, 43 Sup. Ct. 270 (1923); Dayton-Goose
Cr. Ry. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456, 44 Sup. Ct. 169 (1924).
91r3 I. C. C. 3 (1926). Commr. Eastman, appearing before the House Ap-
propriations Subcommittee in January, 1929, listed eighteen decisions up to that
time that had been influenced by the Resolution. The principal case before the
fruit case was Revenues in Western District, 113 I. C. C. 3 (1926), where a
blanket 5% increase was denied on the ground that no special consideration was
shown the products of agriculture. Hearings before subcommittee of House Appro-
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direction to favor agriculture, the special interest which the Resolu-
tion singled out for their attention. The deciduous fruit case was
among these.
When the California growers brought on their new proceeding, in
December 1926, they made the record more complete and exhaustive
than previously. They now showed that their depressed condition,
instead of ameliorating, had grown much worse since 1923. They
asked that the rate be lowered from $1.73 to the 1918 level of $1.44,
in order that they might compete with eastern growers. This time
the full Commission reversed Division i, and reduced the $1.73 rate
to $i.6o, basing the action largely on the Resolution.2 0  Notwith-
standing that it was admitted that $1.73 had not long previously been
found to be not higher than a maximum reasonable rate, a finding
perhaps still valid in 1927, 21 the Commission nevertheless considered
that the Resolution had so changed the law as to require them to set
the rates on products of depressed industries at the bottom instead of
at the top of the zone of reasonableness22 They found that $x.6o met
the minimum requirements, as marked out in Northern Pacific Ry.
v. North Dakota,2 that a rate set by the Commission must pay all
costs assignable to the traffic and at least some contribution to profit.
Commissioner Aitchison wrote the opinion, but it evidently rep-
resented in its entirety the views of only three of the eleven mem-
bers.24 A few months afterward, on reconsideration, the Commission
priations Committee, on Independent Offices Appropriations Bill, 7oth Cong., 2d
Sess., 194 (1929). There have been a number since in Docket 17000. See also
citations in Interstate Commerce Acts Annotated, 2836 ff.
2OSupra note 14.
21The Commission denied that there was a presumption that a rate found not
unreasonable as of the date of the first hearing in 1923 was still not unreasonable
in 1927. Brief for U. S. and L C. C., on reargument, 30.
=This implies, at least theoretically, raising, or allowing" to be raised, some
other rates, to enable the carriers to earn their "fair return;" and that suggests
many more questions. See the concurring opinion of Commissioner Woodlock
in the fruit case, 129 I. C. C. 25, 58 (1927). Candidates for the raise do not offer
themselves.
2236 U. S. 585, 35 Sup. Ct. 429 (i915).
24Three concurred separately; four did not participate. Commissioner McMan-
amy, who had joined in the earlier decision, dissented. Commissioner Eastman,
concurring, thought the rate blanket should be broken up. $1.73 seemed to him
dearly unreasonable for the shorter hauls, but much less clearly so for the haul
to the eastern seaboard, where the bulk of the traffic went; especially since the
eastern carriers secured only small divisions as their share of the rate. Inas-
much as all parties wanted to keep the blanket, he thought the Resolution gave
the benefit of the doubt to the shippers, but he added the caveat, that if the re-
duction granted was justified, probably a stronger case could be made out for
reductions on fruit from eastern growing districts.
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re-aflirmed its decisionFs with minor changes, though in the interval
Commissioner Eastman swung over to join Commissioner McManamy
in dissenting.
From this decision the carriers appealed. The three-judge court in
California, however, declined to grant even so much as a stay of the
Commission's order establishing the lowered rates, pending appeal to
the Supreme Court.21 In the latter court the appeal was argued and
submitted in February 1929; restored to the docket, re-argued in
October at the opening of the 1929 term, and decided on the last day
of that term, June 2, i93o. The decision vacated the Commission's
order.
Mr. Justice Van Devanter, speaking for a unanimous Court,
delivered an opinion that bears some internal evidence of hurried
composition and is unsatisfying in that it disposes of the case
but. not of the questions the case raised. It says little more than
this: that the Resolution directed such "lawful" changes as could be
made in the rate structure, and the lowest possible "lawful" rates for
agricultural products. However, since the meaning of "lawful" can
be ascertained only by reference to the previously existing Interstate
Commerce Act, the Resolution therefore effected no substantive
change in that basic act; indeed, so the Court thought, it effected not
even a clarification. The criteria of a reasonable rate remain as
before. 27 As the Commission had ruled that the Resolution did alter
the Commerce Act, the Commission's decision was reversed. In the
Court's opinion the Resolution is "more in the nature of a hopeful
characterization of an object deemed desirable if, and in so far as, it
may be attainable, than of a rule intended to control rate making. ' 28
And the Court intimated that if the Resolution was intended to do
more, and to reduce rates below the existing lawful standard, a serious
question of its constitutional validity would be raised. Whether the
question would arise under the due process or the commerce clause is
not explained.
The unanimity of the Court, in a field in which it has frequently
2California Growers' and Shippers' Protective League v. So. Pac. Co. et al.,
132 I. C. C. 582 (1927).
UAnn Arbor R. R. v. United States et al., 3o F. (2d) 940 (N. D. Cal. 1928).
27Those who have followed labor injunction cases are familiar with the potency
of the word "lawful" as a bar to change. Hitchiihan Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell,
245 U. S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65 (1917). For a discussion of its possible effect in
limiting changes under the Hoch-Smith Resolution, see D. P. LocKLIN, RAIL-
ROAD REGULATION SINCE 1920 (1928) c. 5.




been divided, suggests that a variety of motives may have contributed
to the decision. Perhaps the circumstances of the passage of the Act,
as a joint resolution rather than as an amendment of the Trans-
portation Act, led some Justices to doubt the seriousness of Congres-
sional intentions; perhaps for that reason minority members were
unwilling to make of the case an issue which could only result in set-
ting down in black and white a constitutional restriction on the
Commission's power in which later changes might be desirable. In
any event, all were content to let the decision rest on a rejection of
the Commission's interpretation of the statute.29
The practical result of the decision as regards aid to agriculture is
not yet entirely settled, but there is little reason to believe that
agricultural interests will find the Resolution materially helpful in
the future. One may indeed go further and express a doubt that any
conceivable rate changes, made under a much more favorable inter-
pretation than has been given of it, could permanently benefit the
majority of the growers of such basic commodities as wheat or cotton.
Their troubles are chiefly independent of the freight rates they pay.
So long as there persists from year to year a surplus of the commod-
ities they have to sell beyond the requirements of their markets,
freight rate changes cannot be expected to help them greatly as a
whole. The effect of the surplus is to create a "buyers' market", in
which competition between producers who must sell is so keen, that
any new benefit, such as a rate reduction, affecting them all, is largely
passed on to the buyer in the form of lower prices.30
A somewhat similar situation has for years been characteristic of
29For the Commission's guidance in the future, the opinion is, therefore, as un-
satisfactory as that in the valuation decision a year before in St. Louis & O'Fallon
Ry. v. United States 279 U. S. 461, 49 Sup. Ct. 384 (1929).30The Bureau of Railway Economics, possibly a not wholly disinterested ob-
server in this case, has recently announced the results of a study of the effect of
freight rates on wheat prices, undertaken following the emergency low rates on
grain for export published by the carriers at the suggestion of President Hoover in
1929. The conclusions stated are that wheat price levels in 1929-193o varied
in response to the influences of oversupply, weather reports, and competing
world market conditions, and that among such factors the influence of freight
rates was, negligible. N. Y. Times, July 28, 193o and Jan. 5, 1931, at 42.
These results are confirmed, generally speaking, by an analysis of the economic
condition of grain farmers prepared by an economist on the Commission's staff
and appended to the Commission's report in the latest grain case, Grain and
Grain Products, 164 I. C. C. 619, 756-793 (1930). Compare the comments of
individual Commissioners, in the same case, at pp. 713, 731, 735, 736. The
operations of agents of the Farm Board in the cash and "futures" markets have
introduced another complicating influence on grain prices, irrespective of freight
rates.
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the coal industry, where productive capacity is vastly in excess of
market demands. Consequently rate reductions to groups of ship-
pers have resulted only in lower prices at competitive centers, rather
than help to the coal operators. This is one root of the long Lake
Cargo controversy already mentioned.
Although rate reductions may not help agriculture as a whole and
in the long run, it by no means follows that the Resolution, more
liberally interpreted, might not have given considerable help, at
least for a time, to particular groups. The California fruit case was
just such an instance. Competitive selling among the growers was
eliminated by their associations and the result of the Commission's
second decision, lowering their rates, would have been a considerable
competitive advantage to them at the expense of Florida growers,
unless and until the latter could secure similar rate reductions, as
Commissioner Eastman suggested in his separate concurrence in that
decision.3
Aside from the possible benefits of reductions when secured, there
remains the practical question of the likelihood that the Commission
will be moved to grant further aid in response to the Resolution as
now interpreted. Perusal of the Commission's record since the
Supreme Court's Ann Arbor ruling suggests a negative answer.3' In
Western Trunk Line Class Rates,3 2 Part 2 under Docket 17000,' made
public in July 1930, the Commission ordered a general upward re-
vision of class rates from which certain agricultural products of im-
portance to the farmer were exempted at least for the present. This
exemption was made on the ground that "the agricultural industry
has not fully recovered from the serious depression following the
World War period," and the proposed rates "would in many in-
stances result in substantial increases thereon, for which sufficient
justification does not appear." The decision, however, was arrived
at on May 6, before the Supreme Court's ruling, although not made
public till afterward.
The next report in Docket 17000, Grain and Grain Products," which
1aSupra note 24.
31The Commission in its-latest annual report to Congress prudently contents
itself with saying, "The effect to be given to the Hoch-Smith Resolution of
Congress has been profoundly influenced by the decision of the Supreme Court on
June 2, 1930 in Ann Arbor R. R. Co. v. U. S." It quotes and paraphrases the de-
cision and then states that the case has been re-opened and further hearing held.
193o ANN. REP. I. C. C. 6I.
2164 I. C. C. I, decided May 6, 193o, but not made public until the new fiscal
year made new printing appropriations available. The farmer's main concern,
in any event, is rather with commodity rates than class rates.
31164 I. C. C. '619 (1930). It fills slightly over 200 pages and includes separate
concurring expressions from eight of the eleven members of the Commission.
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the Commission decided July i, 193o, should have been the crucial
case under the Hoch-Smith Resolution. The grain rate structure
was notoriously chaotic. The chief burden of the agricultural de-
pression fell upon the grain farmer. In this case, if anywhere, the
practical significance of the Resolution and the extent of the Com-
mission's compliance with it should have been tested. During the
hearing of the case exhaustive testimony on the conditions prevailing
in grain-farming was presented. A few weeks before the Commission's
final decision, however, though long after the hearing and argument
on the case, the Supreme Court's Ann Arbor decision was rendered,
and the Commission took cognizance of it thus:
"The Supreme Court of the United States recently inter-
preted the Hoch-Smith resolution as setting up no standard of
reasonableness of rate level or relation other than that already
provided by the interstate commerce act. (citing the Ann
Arbor case.) The findings herein are under the provisions of
the interstate commerce act.134
In view of the scope and complexity of the grain case it is difficult to
generalize upon the results of the decision. Some rates went up and
others down. The new structure as a whole, however, in addition
to bringing some order out of chaos, seems to have been expected to
decrease the carriers' total annual revenues by $15,ooo,ooo. This
strengthens the surmise that the Commission in the fruit case might
have attained the same end, and have escaped reversal on appeal,
had the opinion leaned less frankly upon the Resolution.
Following the grain case came another report in Docket 17000,
Part 3, Cotton,35 decided July 15, 193o. This case was submitted
after the argument in the Supreme Court upon the Ann Arbor case,
and the Commission's decision followed that of the Supreme Court.
The report was written by Commissioner Woodlock, known as less
sympathetic than some others to shippers' arguments that carrier
revenues should be reduced because shippers are in a depressed con-
dition. His opinion had this to say regarding the Resolution:
"Since the submission of this proceeding the Supreme Court
has construed the Hoch-Smith resolution... and found that it
makes no substantial change in the existing law. Economic
evidence bearing upon the question of depression in the cotton-
growing industry... was confined to Oklahoma and Mississippi
... From this evidence we conclude that no substantial de-
pression was shown to exist at the time the hearings were closed.
But even if our conclusions were otherwise we could not, in
3i65 I. C. C. 595 (1930).34Ibid. 661.
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view of the decision of the Supreme Court above mentioned,
accord cotton special treatment in the way of a lower level of
rates than would have been possible prior to the adoption of the
resolution.""
If in future cases'the Commission leans over backward in an effort
to comply with the Ann Arbor decision, it may be that the Resolution
as now interpreted will become a block in the pathway of further help
by the Commission to farmers instead of the mandate to aid them
which it originally appeared to be. Congress may be content to let
the Resolution stand as its answer to agricultural demands, while as
its "teeth" are so drawn, it is unlikely the carriers will push the
movement for repeal that has been agitated in some quarters.
III.
The A-ni Arbor decision contributes disappointingly little to the
constitutional question as to how far federal authority, in fixing rates,
may be empowered to take account of the needs of the shipper and
the commercial conditions prevailing in his industry,37 and to judge,
partly on that basis, as between different geographical sections of the
country. Obviously, it is a tremendous power, full of political dyna-
mite. Every considerable rate change benefits some groups and in-
jures others-that is why rate cases are fought. So long as the criteria
are the cost of service and what the traffic will bear, a commission
with a tradition of independence, ability, and industry may perhaps
give reasonable satisfaction. When, however, the criterion becomes
the need of the shipper to be benefited, or his ability to absorb injury,
the pressure to depart from rational considerations is naturally much
greater. During the Lake Cargo controversy, for example, the Senate's
actions toward nominees to the Interstate Commerce Commission
were such as seriously to challenge the Commission's powers. 8 A
36bi. 598.
27This question may soon be raised again before the Supreme Court in the
present Lake Cargo case, Western Pennsylvania Coal Traffic Bureau v. B. & 0.
R. R., Docket 23241, now still in the stage of hearings before the Commission,
if the decision is appealed. Supra notes 3 and 9.
38The rejection of Com-r. Esch's renomination was by no means an isolated
incident, though it attracted the widest public attention. Typical of much that
went on during the whole 1928 session was the Robinson Resolution, S. Con-
current Res. 10, 7oth Cong., 1st Sess., introduced Feb. 8, 1928, and passed the
next day. 69 CONG. REC. 2791, 2865-2871 (1928). It directed the Commission
to furnish the Senate with copies of all decisions during the previous five years
"in which its decisions as to the reasonableness of any rate or rates was in any
sense influenced by the competitive advantage or disadvantage of the producers
in one state, district or section" as compared with another, and citations of
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fear lest such bullying become inevitable and habitual may possibly
have been another factor in the unanimity of the Supreme Court's
decision of the Ann Arbor case.
The railroads themselves have, as a matter of course, given con-
.sideration to the conditions prevailing in an industry whenever it
was advantageous from a traffic standpoint to do so. They have
developed new sections-coal fields in West Virginia, for example-
by "missionary" rates, and they have cut rates in order to get new
business, or to save old business that otherwise would be lost. It is
doubtless true, however, that the instances are few of rates cut from
pure compassion for a depressed industry.39 On the other hand, al-
though perhaps it is less likely that the prosperous shipper will make
a complaint, it has been held that the prosperity of a shipper does not
of itself justify a carrier in raising a previously remunerative rate,
simply because the shipper can stand the raise.40
Even before the Hoch-Smith Resolution the Commission, despite
its disclaimer, had in a sense considered commercial conditions too.4'
In 1912, in Boileau v. P. & L. E. R. R., counsel for the coal-operator
complainants called attention to the wages, standard of living, pro-
duction costs, and conditions generally in the industry. Commis-
sioner Meyer in his opinion said:
"Whatever weight it may be permissible under the statute to
give to considerations of this kind in the determination of a
question like that presented here, it would seem that wages of
miners and their standard of living should be kept in view, and
that great issues affecting them should not be decided with-
out at least bringing their interests into the horizon of con-
any statute, "under which the commission claims and believes it was granted
the power to equalize prosperity among the producers of commodities; and a
statement of the clauses.. of the Constitution under which it claims and be-
lieves that decisions of such a character and purport were authorized or were im-
plied." See G. H. Robinson, op. cit. supra note 9, at 634 and n. 79.
39Except in the emergency relief of a disaster, when the railroads are authorized
and have on numerous occasions rendered effective assistance without charge, or
at a reduced charge. A list of references to such instances covering the period
19o6-193o was compiled and issued by the Library of the Bureau of Railway
Economics, October, 1930.40Southern Ry. v. Tift, 2o6 U. S. 428, 27 Sup. Ct. 709 (1907). "...the in-
creased prosperity of the business... is no ground for an advance of the rate."
Tift v. Southern Ry., 10 I. C. C. 548, 582 (r905).
41This factor perhaps overlaps, but is not exactly coextensive with the "value
of the service to the shipper," which allows a rate to vary roughly with the in-
trinsic value of the freight. Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639,
650, 33 Sup. Ct. 391, 394 (1913). It is closer to "what the traffic will bear," a
phrase that was expounded by Commr. Lane in Advance in Coal Rates by the
C. & 0., 22 I. C. C. 604, 623 (1912).
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sciousness.. Whatever legal limitations may be imposed on
this view by the act to regulate commerce as at present inter-
preted, from the point of view of public policy and humanity,
considerations like those adverted to by counsel should most
assuredly not be ignored."'
It may also be remarked that a shipper is not disqualified from
securing a lower rate by reason of his business being depressed, if he
is otherwise entitled to it; and from his point of view the result is the
same whether the reduction is granted because of his need or on other
grounds. It answers his need in either event, and he will probably
insist the more keenly on the other grounds if he feels also the pres-
sure of need. It is clear therefore that a change in rates, for whatever
reason, may often have the effect of equalizing prosperity or benefiting
one section at the expense of another. In this sense, the Commission
is already and inevitably an "economic arbiter of the country". Criti-
cism of the Commission for what it cannot help being, therefore,
seems beside the point.
A more fruitful inquiry is the extent to which the different purposes
may confessedly be allowed to motivate the Commission's decisions.
On this subject the Interstate Commerce Act gives no further direc-
tions than that rates which the Commission may require must be
"just and reasonable", and that the carriers must refrain from undue
preference or prejudice.
The Commission has previously found its control of several im-
portant similar situations inadequate under Section 3, because of its
doctrine, evolved in the Ashland Fire Brick"' case, that it could under
Section 3 order a carrier to remove discrimination as between two
localities only when the same carrier served, or at least shared in the
traffic of, both localities, and could by its own act eliminate the dis-
crimination. This doctrine was afterward approved by the Supreme
Court in Central R. R. of N. J. v. United States,"4 where the discrimi-
nation involved was the granting of the privilege of creosoting lumber
in transit. Later the strict rule was somewhat liberalized in the
Swift Lumber case,45 where a trunk line offering a preferred rate in
order to build up its territory was held in fact able to control the
422 I. C. C. 640, 647 (1912). 4322 I. C. C. I15 (1911).
41257 U. S. 247, 42 Sup. Ct. 80 (1921), vacating the Commission's order in
American Creosoting Co. v. Director General, 61 I. C. C. 145 (1921). Same case,
66 I. C. C. 54 (1921).
4United States v. Ill. Cent. R. R., 263 U. S. 515, 44 Sup. Ct. 189 (1924),
upholding the Commission's orders in Swift Lumber Co. v. Fernwood & G. R. R.,
61 I. C. C. 485 (1921), and Pioneer Lbr. Co. v. Director General, 64 1. C. C. 485
(1921).
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action of a branch line which it compelled to publish a discriminatory
rate. The trunk line was therefore ordered to remove the discrimi-
nation. The general rule, however, prevented the Commission from
equalizing port differentials in the Sugar Cases of 1922,46 in response
to a suggestion that commercial conditions demanded such a course.
Likewise in the 1927 Lake Cargo case, although the Commission re-
duced the coal rate from Pittsburgh to the lake ports as unreasonable,
it declined to take the additional step necessary to assure the Pitts-
burgh shippers the benefit of the reduction by finding also that their
rate was unduly prejudicial as compared with the West Virginia rate.
It based its refusal on the fact that the respondent carriers served
the northern fields only. On the other hand, in the Salt Cases of 192347
the Commission freed itself from this limitation, and fixed rate rela-
tionships from various producing districts, although served by dif-
ferent carriers, to the principal consuming market, Chicago. The re-
sult was achieved by the use of the minimum rate power and was
justified by the imminence of a rate war. There was also ground for
believing that the Illinois Central, the principal carrier involved, was
offering the low rate on salt in order to secure the freight traffic of
salt shippers who had large interests in other businesses--that the
low salt rate, in other words, was in effect a concealed rebate. A
three-judge federal court sustained the decision on the ground that
the minimum rate power was not subject to the limitations that re-
strict the Commission under Section 3.
The extent to which the Commission now may consider commer-
cial conditions in judging a complaint of discrimination under Section
3, or, conversely, the extent to which it may use Section 3 in curbing
the unrestricted dominance by the railroads of the economic develop-
ment of competing localities, is illustrated in the Gulf Port Differ-
ential case,48 now on its way to the Supreme Court. In this case the
Commission, after changing its mind once or twice, fixed a differen-
tial in rates to the Texas ports under the New Orleans rate, which had
previously been equalized despite its greater distance, on traffic from
interior Texas, Oklahoma, etc. points. It concluded that discrimi-
nation existed against the Texas ports, on the basis of two sorts of
1681 1. C. C. 448 (1923).
41The Commission reports and the court decision on appeal are cited supra
note 5.48Galveston Commercial Ass'n. v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry., ioo I. C. C. 1Io
(1925), rev'd, in part and modified in 128 I. C. C. 349 (1927), further modified
in I6o I. C. C. 345 (1929); the last of these was sustained in Texas & P. Ry. v.
United States, 42 F. (2d) 281 (S. D. Tex. i93o), and, an appeal is pending in the
Supreme Court.
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evidence, first the carriers' ignoring of transportation costs reflected
in the greater distance to New Orleans, and second the overwhelming
proportion of traffic going through New Orleans instead of the Texas
ports under the equalized rates. The Commission said:
"Such an adjustment necessarily disregards distance and
commercial, instead of natural advantages, control. We have
consistently refused to condemn such an adjustment where it is
shown to serve the best interests of the public, but where, as
here, it builds up one port at the expense of another equally
favored by natural advantages from the origin territory here
considered, a line must be found beyond which distance may
not be disregarded. ' 49
Moreover the Commission included, among the carriers ordered to
eliminate the discrimination, the Texas & Pacific Railway, which
originates traffic both to New Orleans and the Texas ports, but
reaches only New Orleans over its own rails. The carrier's originating
and sharing in traffic to both ports was held sufficient ground for
bringing it within the scope of Section 3. If this step in emancipation
from the rule of the Ashland Fire Brick case is sustained in the Su-
preme Court as it has been in the lower court, the Commission would
presumably be able, if it chooses to do so, to take similar action in
the pending Lake Cargo case, and prescribe rate relationships from
all producing fields.50 It would than be less hampered in its dealings
under Section 3 with large situations involving different carriers,
growing out of conflicting sectional interests. Consideration of
commercial conditions in discrimination cases might then be expected
to play a somewhat more important part.
Under Section i the Commission's discretion in considering com-
mercial conditions might seem to be broader.' It was limited by the
4'1oo I. C. C. 11O, 121, 122 (1925).
5°This case, supra note 3, is purely a Section 3 case. In the 1927 case the Pitts-
burgh rates were found unreasonable but not unduly prejudicial. The view is
being urged on the Commission in this case that Section 3 condemns all undue
discrimination, and that although the Ashland rule was necessary in its time
because of the limits of the remedies available to the Commission, the reason
for the rule's existence has disappeared since the minimum rate power was given
the Commission. It is, therefore, urged that the Commission is free to alter any
rate relationships found discriminatory, and to enforce a proper relationship by
setting a minimum rate, regardless of whether any one carrier can remove the
discrimination. The Commission has not thus far accepted this view, in the ab-
sence of a rate war threat.
5'Possibly a rate on the lower level of the "twilight zone" might be "reason-
able" in the sense of not being confiscatory, and yet fail to be "just," if set to
shift some of the burden of depression upon the carrier.
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Supreme Court, however, in Northern Pacific Ry. v. North Dakota,12
and indeed the Commission had already virtually declared it to be
nonexistent, in the other notable-passage from the Ashland Fire Brick
case previously quoted.3 It was this view that, while the carrier might
if it chose disregard cost in favor of the value of the service to the ship-
per, the Commission could not do so, which seemed to be altered by
the Hoch-Smith Resolution. The Commission interpreted the Resolu-
tion as changing the previous law to the extent that it might now in
fixing rates insist upon the value of the service to the shipper, within
the limits of the "zone of reasonableness".
This penumbral "zone of reasonableness" may be taken to mean
the difference between the "maximum reasonable rate" usually fixed
by the Commission, beyond which a rate would be exorbitant, and
the minimum required by Northern Pacific Ry. v. North Dakota. It
is perhaps indicated concretely in the Ann Arbor case by the differ-
ence between the $1.73 rate, which was upheld in 1923, and the $.6o
rate set in I 9 26.6 The phrase may also refer, more simply, to the
margin of uncertainty that exists because so many of the factors in-
volved are indeterminate.5s Commonly it includes both notions. At
any rate, in the. earlier Grain and Grain Products6 case and the Live
Stock case,5 a the Commission took the view that by the Resolution
Congress undertook to direct the exercise of their discretion so that
instead of always fixing a maximum reasonable rate, the Commission
2236 U. S. 585, 35 Sup. Ct. 429 (1915). The opinion is by Mr. Justice Hughes
who resigned soon after, and returned to the Court in time to see its principles re-
affirmed in the Ann Arbor case. He did not participate in the latter decision,
since the case was argued on behalf of the United States by his son, Charles E.
Hughes, Jr., as Solicitor General. The doctrine of the case, as later paraphrased
by the Commission, is that: "Rates that we may lawfully require must in prin-
ciple be high enough to cover all the cost that may fairly be allocated to the
service, plus at least some margin of profit." Amer. Nat. Live Stock Ass'n. v.
Atchison, etc., Ry., 122 I. C. C. 6o9, 617 (1927). See Grain and Grain Products,
122 I. C. C. 235, 264 (1927).
OSupra note 17. "Supra note 21.
51In Interstate Commerce Commission v. U. P. R. R., 222 U. S. 541, 550, 32
Sup. Ct. lo8, ix2 it was said: "With that sort of evidence before them, rate
experts of acknowledged ability and fairness, and each acting independently of
the other, may not have reached identically the same conclusion. We do not
know whether the results would have been approximately the same. For there is
no possibility of solving the question as though it were a mathematical problem
to -which there could only be one correct answer."
And the Commission, in the Live Stock case, supra note 52: "Rates that we
may lawfully require must in principle be high enough to cover all the cost that
may be fairly allocated to the service, plus at least some margin of profit... we
say 'in principle' because only rarely is definite information available as to such
cost, and in practice rates must often be fixed largely by comparison with other
rates." WSupra note 52. rsslbid.
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must now set a minimum reasonable rate for a certain class, i. e.,
shippers in depressed industries. Assuming that the classification
itself is reasonable,17 any rate which falls within the general limits of
the zone may presumably be set without transgressing the Fifth
Amendment. Carrier counsel in the Ann Arbor case objected that
this was not within the commerce power of Congress, and it is mere
conjecture whether this or the Fifth Amendment was the ground of
the Court's intimation of its doubt of constitutionality.
The result of the Commission's interpretation of the Resolution
led it in the fruit case to do fankdy what it had been unable in pre-
vious cases to avoid or ignore wholly, but could not do explicitly
under the previous statutes. By its frankness it drew upon its col-
lective head, as a result of the Lake Cargo decisions particularly, a
storm of political abuse. In the Ann Arbor case the Commission
argued that an added definition had been given to "reasonable"; that
it had done nothing it could not have done under the basic Act; but
it admitted that what had been done was largely in response to the
Resolution. The Court was of opinion that "the Commission's con-
struction cannot be supported. The paragraph does not purport to
make any change in the existing law, .. . but on the contrary leaves
the validity of the rate to be tested by that law. 's7a This seems to
take no account of a "zone of reasonableness"; and to the long-argued
question, concerning the extent to which the Commission can give
weight to the needs and condition of the shipper, it answers only,
"No more than at present."
61The equal protection clause, of course, is a part of the Fourteenth amend-
ment only, not of the Fifth. The power of Congress under the Fifth Amendment
"admits of the exercise of a wide discretion in classifying according to general,
rather than minute, distinctions, and condemns what is done only when it is with-
out any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary." Second Employers
Liability Cases, 223 U. S. I, 53, 32 Sup. Ct. 169, 176 (1912). The general rule
against class legislation is more honored in the breach than in the observance as
regards railroad rate-fixing. For example, in Northern Pacific Ry. v. North
Dakota, supra note 52, at 598, 599, 35 Sup. Ct. at 434: "The legislature, un-
doubtedly, has a wide range of discretion in the exercise of the power to prescribe
reasonable charges, and it is not bound to fix uniform rates for all commodities,
or to secure the same percentage of profit on every sort of business. There are
many factors to be considered, differences in the articles transported, the care
required, the risk assumed, the value of the service, and it is obviously important
that there should be reasonable adjustments and classifications." And in United
States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 416, 29 Sup. Ct. 527, 539 (1909),
upholding the constitutionality of the "commodities clause," the Court said:
"We know of no constitutional limitation requiring that such a regulation (the
commodities clause) when adopted should be applied to all commodities alike."
31aAnn Arbor R. R. v. United States, supra note 12, at 668, 5o Sup. Ct. at 446.
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IV.
In conclusion these statements maybe ventured: i. The systematic
revision of the entire rate structure in progress under Docket 17,000
will continue undisturbed by the Ann Arbor decision. It may be
noted that the Commission itself, in an oral statement made public
on December 4, 1929, indicated that it regarded its work along this
line as of more importance then than its efforts in fostering thecon-
solidation of railroads.
2. The decision may be helpful in tending to prevent a recurrence
of such political interference with the Commission as the Senate's'
action on the reappointment of Commissioner Esch, but it is doubtful
that it can eliminate it entirely. So long as the result of a rate de-
cision, whatever its grounds, may make or break the industrial
prosperity of one section as compared with another, political pres-
sures will exist, and occasionally result in explosions.5 s
3. It is problematical what further help there may be for farmers
in the Resolution, but it would seem that the carriers need fear little
more from it. The general rate revision under Docket i7,ooo may be
expected to proceed with due concern for the preservation of railroad
revenues and the "maintenance of an adequate system of transporta-
tion."
5 9
4. In any event, consideration of commercial conditions, in fixing
rates, will continue to some extent because the Commission cannot
ignore those condition's so long as the carriers voluntarily pay atten-
tion to them. But the Commission may have to proceed more cau-
tiously lest its fingers be burned in political fires-and there will be
further pressure against frank and frequent reversals in decisions. To
those who approve the Commission's present'emancipation from
the strict rule of stare decisis, tehdencies of this sort are regrettable.
Meanwhile, in considering rate complaints from depressed shippers,
the Commission will attempt to adjust its interpretation of the Hoch-
Smith Resolution to accord with the words of Mr. justice Van De-
vanter's opinion: "Of course, they should not lightly be disregarded.
Neither should they lightly be accepted as overturning positive and
unambiguous provisions constituting part of a system of laws reflecting
a settled legislative policy, such as the Interstate Commerce Act."8 0
"
8Witness the Senate's attitude towards the appointment to the Commission,
later withdrawn at the appointee's request, of Mr. R. M. Jones of Knoxville,
Tennessee, in December, 1929.
"In its latest annual report the Comnission displays rather more than its
usual concern for the financial condition and prospects of the railroads. 1930
ANN. REP. I. C. C., 77-78.
"
0Ann. Arbor R. R. v. United States, supra note X12, at 669, 5o Sup. Ct.
at 446, 447.
